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 1 Introduction
Of the many economies that underwent economic restructuring since the early 1990s, East
Germany stands out due to various policies implemented by the government. Two striking
policies are the large transfers received from West Germany and the dramatic increases in
wages agreed upon by unions and the government. I examine the implications of these policies
on the economic development of East Germany, in a model with embodied technological
change. I ﬁnd that transfers and high wages had a signiﬁcant impact on East Germany’s
output growth and factor income shares.
The monetary transfers East Germany has received from West Germany since 1990 are
very large, ranging from 30 to 50 p e r c e n to fE a s tG e r m a n y ’ sg r o s sd o m e s t i cp r o d u c te a c h
year. In spite of this extensive support, East Germany did not experience the growth miracle
many had hoped for.1 Equally puzzling is the behavior of East Germany’s capital income
share. In 1991, the share of income attributed to capital was very low at 14 percent, and it
rose throughout the transition to the more standard ﬁgure of 34 percent. I build a model that
can account for the observed dynamics of output and factor income shares in East Germany.
I nt h em o d e l ,t r a n s f e r sh a v eap o s i t i v ei m p a c to ng r o w t h ,t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e ya r eu s e dt o
promote capital investment.2 Moreover, dramatic increases in wages, like those observed in
East Germany, depress output growth by deterring capital accumulation (as suggested, for
example, in Akerlof, Rose, Yellen, and Hessenius (1991) and Sinn (2007)) and by depressing
labor supply. The two policies have somewhat oﬀsetting eﬀects on output growth, which
helps explain why a growth miracle did not occur in East Germany. When coupled with
technology change, transfers and high wage increases contribute to lowering the returns to
capital, helping to account for the behavior of the capital income share.
I develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which an economy gains access to
a higher productivity technology embodied in new plants. This is motivated by the fact
that, following the reforms in the early 1990s, East Germany and other Eastern European
economies integrated into the world economy and started to beneﬁt from the technologies
of industrialized economies. In the model, production takes place at individual plants that
m a yb eo p e r a t e do rl e f ti d l ea ta n yg i v e nt i m e . T h e s ep l a n t sa r et h ec a p i t a ls t o c ko ft h e
economy, so I shall use the terms “plants” and “capital” interchangeably henceforth. As
1Hoﬀmann (1992) documents the diﬀering outlooks on the development of East Germany that prevailed
early in the transition. Some believed that East Germany would grow fast, while others feared it would
develop into a depressed region. Between 1991 and 2006, the average annual growth rate of gross domestic
product per working-age person in East Germany was 4.5 percent. In contrast, Poland, an economy that did
not beneﬁt from large transfers from the rest of the world, grew by 4 percent on average. By comparison,
East Germany’s performance is less than stellar.
2Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (1996) also show that foreign aid is conducive to higher GDP growth.
2high productivity plants are built gradually over time, the existing low productivity plants
decrease their production and eventually shut down.
The two policies are incorporated in the model as follows. Transfers from the rest of the
world can be used either for consumption or investment in capital, allowing the economy’s
total use of resources to expand beyond domestic production. Wage increases are modeled as
union markups, the magnitude of which can be mandated by the government.3 During the
transition from a low to a high productivity technology, transfers allow for more investment
in the high productivity capital and thus have a positive eﬀect on output growth. High
wages depress the accumulation of capital and lower growth. Moreover, both policies lower
the economy’s labor supply which also contributes to reducing output growth.
The model’s capital income share varies endogenously over time due to variation in the
proﬁt share of low productivity plants. The key feature of the model driving this result is a
non-convexity in the plant-level production technology: plants require a minimum amount
of labor to produce output, as in Hansen and Prescott (2005). If plants employ more than
the minimum required labor, their proﬁts are a constant share of output. However, if plants
operate at the minimum scale, they hire more labor than would be the case in the absence
of this labor constraint, and their proﬁt share is low. During the transition, low produc-
tivity plants have a declining proﬁt share of output and are gradually replaced with high
productivity plants whose proﬁt share is constant. As a result, the economy’s capital income
share displays U-shaped dynamics. Once all low productivity capital is left idle, the capital
share is constant. In addition to the eﬀects arising from technology change, the govern-
ment policies contribute to lowering the capital share during the transition. Both transfers
and government-mandated wage increases reduce the proﬁt share of low productivity plants
further, because they increase the cost of labor.4
I calibrate the model and examine its quantitative predictions. The model matches East
Germany’s output growth from 1991 to 2006. It also delivers a decline in output in the ﬁrst
years of the transition — albeit of a smaller than observed magnitude — due to a large decline
in labor supply. This reduction in labor is consistent with data. Moreover, the model predicts
the capital income share is low in 1991 and rises throughout the transition, as observed in
3Burda and Hunt (2001) argue that unions were able to choose wages in East Germany early in the
transition. Akerlof, Rose, Yellen, and Hessenius (1991) argue that the West German government supported
the wage increases since it thought this would prevent migration to the West and the ensuing reduction in
Western wages. Sinn (2007) documents that the head of the Treuhandanstalt — the Trust set up to privatize
the East German companies — was told, by the federal government, to stay away from the wage bargaining.
He argues that the German government bears responsibility for allowing the wage increases.
4Sinn (2007, pp. 162-163) argues that the dramatic increase in wages in East Germany altered investment
prospects and kept investors away. He documents that only 9 percent of the privatized East German
companies were sold to foreign investors, and attributes this dearth of investors to expectations of reduced
proﬁts due to high wages.
3East German data. Technology change by itself generates relatively small variations in the
capital share. The transfers and wage increases are important contributors to the capital
share’s initial decline, as they increase the cost of labor and lower proﬁts of low productivity
plants. The model also matches East German data on expenditure shares of output. It
predicts high consumption to output and investment to output ratios due to the transfers
available. Lastly, I perform a counterfactual experiment which shows that without the large
government-mandated wage increases, East Germany would have grown more, partly due to
faster accumulation of the higher productivity capital, and partly due to higher labor supply
throughout the transition.
I also consider the model’s predictions for Poland and contrast them with the results
obtained for East Germany. During its transition, Poland received small transfers from the
rest of the world, amounting to about 1.5 percent of gross domestic product, as compared
to East Germany’s 30 to 50 percent. In addition, Poland experienced more moderate wage
growth as a result of the introduction of a special tax to discourage wage increases. The
model predicts that the variation in the capital share during Poland’s transition is moderate,
as observed in the data. The capital income share varies over time due to technology change,
while the contributions from the two policies are unimportant. The prediction for output
misses the initial drop observed in Poland. While the model delivers an initial decline in
output for East Germany due to a decline in labor supply, for Poland the reduction in labor
is smaller and is oﬀset entirely by the increase in capital accumulation.
A number of papers have explored factors common across transition economies that could
account for the sharp declines in output observed in the early 1990s.5 It has been shown
that some quantitatively important factors are: costs associated with the adoption of new
technologies of production (as in Atkeson and Kehoe (1993)) or collapses in trade (Rodrik
(1994) and Gorodnichenko, Mendoza, and Tesar (2009)). While this paper does not propose
a theory of the sharp declines in output observed in all transition economies, it contributes to
this literature by showing that part of the initial decline in output observed in East Germany
was due to government policies that led to a large fall in labor supply. It is well documented
that East Germany experienced the largest downturn in output in the ﬁrst two years of
transition among Eastern European economies.6 Moreover, the decline in labor supply was
5Declines in output for a number of transition economies are documented, for example, in Blanchard and
Kremer (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1999). For a survey of the literature on the various explanation for
these initial output declines, see Campos and Coricelli (2002).
6Dornbusch and Wolf (1994, Table 5.3) compare changes in gross domestic product for East Germany,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland between 1989 and 1991 to emphasize the severity of East Germany’s
initial downturn. Also see Sinn and Sinn (1992, pp. 29-31). I reach the same conclusion when comparing
gross domestic product per working-age person across a number of Eastern European economies.
4also large in East Germany compared to other economies.7 The quantitative analysis in this
paper shows that the transfer and high wage policies contribute to reducing labor supply
consistent with East German data. This leads to a sizable decline in the model’s output early
in the transition — a prediction that doesn’t occur if transfers are small and wage growth is
moderate.
This work also contributes to the literature on the variation in factor income shares.
A number of existing papers document the cyclical properties of the labor income share
in the U.S. and put forth theories that can account for these facts. It has been shown
that a counter-cyclical labor share may arise due to an optimal risk-sharing arrangement
between ﬁrms and workers (as in Boldrin and Horvath (1995) and Gomme and Greenwood
(1995)), due to monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale (Hornstein (1993))
or due to a capacity constraint that binds during periods of expansion (Hansen and Prescott
(2005)). Moreover, Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2009) emphasize the importance of
understanding the eﬀects of productivity shocks on the labor share, while Choi and Ríos-Rull
(2008) explore the ability of a model with noncompetitive factor markets to generate such
eﬀects. This paper shares with this work the interest in understanding variations in factor
income shares, but it diﬀers in that the focus is on low frequency changes in factor shares. I
show that variations in factor shares arise during the process of technology adoption. While
this paper analyses the experience of East Germany, this ﬁn d i n gh a sp o t e n t i a lf o raw i d e r
applicability. Technology change induces relatively small variations in the model’s capital
share, and so it is a possible mechanism that could account for some of the changes in factor
shares over time in the U.S. and other economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents facts pertaining
to the transition of East Germany and compares its experience with that of Poland. Section
3 develops the theoretical framework . Section 4 discusses the predictions of the model for
output growth and factor income shares, highlighting in turn the contributions of technology
and government policies. Section 5 presents the quantitative results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 On the Transitions in East Germany and Poland
This section presents data on output, the capital income share, net transfers received from
the rest of the world and wages for East Germany and Poland. The sources of data are given
in Appendix A.1.
7Blanchard, Commander, and Coricelli (1995) document changes in employment for a number of
economies, while Dornbusch and Wolf (1994) report it for East Germany. I compute hours worked per
working-age person for East Germany (see footnote 22) and a number of other transition economies (see
Appendix A.1 for data sources). I ﬁnd the decline in hours was largest in East Germany.
5Output per working-age person (i.e. population 15-64) in both East Germany and Poland
contracted for a period of two years, but displayed positive growth thereafter (see Figure
1). Between 1989 and 1991, East German gross domestic product per working-age person
shrunk by about one third. Thereafter, the economy started to grow, initially very rapidly
and then at a slower pace starting 1996. In comparison, the changes in GDP per working-age
person in Poland were more moderate. The initial decline was smaller, at about 17 percent,
while the growth in the early years of the transition was also lower compared to that of East
Germany. However, the overall growth experience of the two economies has been relatively
similar. Over the 16 year period from 1991 to 2006, output per working-age person grew on
average by 4.5 percent in East Germany and by 4 percent in Poland.
The share of income accruing to capital shows interesting diﬀerences between the two
economies. Following Kravis (1959) and Gollin (2002), I compute the capital income share,
ζ, as follows:
ζ =1−
Compensation of Employees + Labor Income of Self-Employed
Gross Domestic Product - Indirect Taxes
(1)
Over the period 1991 to 2006, the capital share varied little in Poland, averaging 37 percent
( s e eF i g u r e2 ) . 8 In contrast, the capital share varied greatly in East Germany. It was very
low in 1991,a t14 percent, and then it increased over time, averaging 34 percent in the last
ten years.9 Prior to 1991, data needed to compute the capital share for both economies is
incomplete. However, available estimates suggest that the capital share in East Germany
in 1989 was much higher than the value observed in 1991.10 The variation in the capital
share in East Germany represents a large deviation from the relative constancy of this share
documented by many authors. For example, Kaldor (1961) identiﬁes the relative stability
of the factor shares across time as a “stylized fact” of economic growth. Gollin (2002)
documents the relative constancy of factor income shares across countries.
8After Poland joined the European Union in 2004, the compensation of employees to GDP ratio declined
by about 4.5 percentage points. As a result, the capital income share increased to about 44 percent, as seen
in the last few years in Figure 2. The lastest available data shows that the compensation to GDP ratio rose
in 2008 relative to its level in 2004 − 2006, suggesting that the capital share is now closer to 40 percent.
9The dramatic increase in the capital share in East Germany is driven by the decrease in the compensation
of employees to GDP ratio. Between 1991 and 2006, this ratio declined by about 40 percent. Taking into
account the labor income of self-employed and indirect taxes (as in equation 1) has a relatively small impact
on the overall increase in the capital share over the 16 year period. For more detail, see Appendix A.1.
10One proxy for the level of the capital share is the compensation of employees to GDP ratio. As reported
by Sinn and Sinn (1992, pp. 209-216), this ratio was about 40 p e r c e n ti nE a s tG e r m a n yi n1989. (Similarly,
in Poland this ratio was about 41 percent in the early 1990s.) Furthermore, East Germany’s consumption
of ﬁxed capital, one component of capital income, was 15 percent of GDP in 1988, as reported by United
Nations (1988, Table 1.3, p. 611). This value is close to the average depreciation to GDP ratio for East
Germany during the 1980s. These facts suggest that the capital share was high in East Germany in 1989.
6Through the course of the transition, both economies beneﬁted from transfers from the
rest of the world.11 East Germany has received transfers from West Germany and the
European Union. In 1991, net transfers were 52 percent of East German GDP. Although
there has been a signiﬁcant decline over time, net transfers to East Germany still amounted
to 30 percent of GDP in 2002 (see left panel in Figure 6). A large portion of transfers has
been channeled through social beneﬁt programs to households and used for consumption
purposes (see, for example, Jensen (2004)). Some transfers have been used to encourage
investment by providing subsidies to ﬁrms. By contrast, Poland received transfers from the
European Union averaging about 1.5 percent of GDP per year.
Another important diﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e nE a s tG e r m a n ya n dP o l a n di si nt h ew a g ep o l i c y
adopted during the transition. Over the period 1989 to 1991, real hourly wages increased
dramatically in East Germany compared to Poland (see Table 1). These high wages were
made possible through the intervention of the powerful West German unions who had the
government’s support. One of the reasons for raising wages was the fear that East Germany
would become an attractive location for foreign investors, due to low wage costs, and would
provide unwanted competition for ﬁrms in West Germany (see, for example, Sinn (2007) and
Burda and Funke (2001)).12 In contrast to East Germany’s high wage policy, Poland’s gov-
ernment introduced a temporary wage tax to discourage large increases in wages. Although
many enterprises chose to raise wages and pay this punitive tax, wage growth in Poland was
more moderate during the transition.13
In the next sections, I examine the facts presented here on output and the capital share
through the lens of a model economy that receives transfers from the rest of the world and
has government-mandated wage increases.
11Transfers are transactions in which an entity receives goods, services or cash payments from another
entity without providing anything in return. Net transfers for East Germany and Poland are the diﬀerence
between transfers received from the rest of the world and transfers paid to the rest of the world.
12Other reasons for the wage increases are discussed in Akerlof, Rose, Yellen, and Hessenius (1991). For
details on the wage bargaining process and the rapid increase in wages in East Germany also see Krueger
and Pischke (1995), Burda and Hunt (2001), Burda and Funke (2001), Dornbusch and Wolf (1994) and
Sinn (2007, pp. 161-163). The last two sources also discuss the replacement of the East German mark
with the deutschmark. They argue that the one-to-one currency conversion was not the main mistake made
by the German government, but the wage increases that came after this conversion were more problematic.
Particularly, without the ensuing wage increases, the currency conversion would have left East German wages
at a relatively low level.
13For a discussion of the temporary wage controls instituted in Poland through the so-called popiwek tax,
see, for example, Sachs (1993) and Freeman (1994).
73M o d e l E c o n o m y
3.1 Production Technology
Aggregate output is produced from two factors of production: labor and capital. The aggre-
gate labor input is a composite of diﬀerentiated types of labor. The capital input consists of
plants where production can take place.
There are two types of plants distinguished by their productivity level zi ∈ {zL,z H}, with
zL <z H. I refer to plants with productivity level zi as zi-plants. The output of a zi-plant at





i,t if ni,t ≥ ¯ n
0 otherwise
(2)
where ni,t is the quantity of composite labor input employed by a zi-plant at time t.14
There is a minimum requirement of (composite) labor necessary to operate a plant. This
minimum is identical across plant types and is given by ¯ n.
Ic o n s t r a i nθ ∈ (0,1). This assumption guarantees that it is optimal to operate many
s m a l lp l a n t sr a t h e rt h a no n el a r g ep l a n t .M o r e o v e r ,a l lo p e r a t i n gp l a n t so ft h es a m et y p ew i l l
employ the same amount of labor. The requirement that ni,t ≥ ¯ n together with a limited
number of potential workers implies an upper bound on the number of plants that can be
operated. Labor can be moved across locations at no cost, hence it will only be allocated to
plants with ni,t ≥ ¯ n. As a result, at any point in time some plants may be left idle.
Let Mi,t denote the stock of zi-plants that can potentially be operated at time t and let Nt
denote the aggregate labor to be employed at time t.15 The aggregate production function
of this economy is deﬁned by (3), where mi,t is the mass of zi-plants that are operated at
14The plant labor input, ni,t,i∈ {L,H} is a composite of diﬀerentiated types of labor, li,t (j),j∈ [0,1].
Here li,t (j) denotes the labor of type j hired by a plant of type zi at time t. The choice of li,t (j) can be
separated from the choice of the composite plant labor input ni,t. For details see the derivation of the demand
for labor of type j (equation 7), as well as footnote 16.
15In this economy, the plants represent the entire capital stock of the economy. Equipment is typically a
small fraction of the total capital stock (about 15% i nb o t hE a s ta n dW e s tG e r m a n y )a n dIc o n s i d e ri tt o
be tied to the structures/plants.
8time t and are allocated ni,t units of labor input.







s.t. mH,tnH,t + mL,tnL,t ≤ Nt
0 ≤ mi,t ≤ Mi,t, for all i
ni,t ≥ ¯ n, for all i
For each time period t, this is a static maximization problem. Finding the maximum
output that can be produced in a given period involves allocating the aggregate labor input,
Nt, across the available plants in the economy. If there are enough high productivity plants to
employ all the labor that needs to be hired, then it is optimal to leave all the low productivity
plants idle. However, if there is a scarcity of zH-plants, some or all of the zL-plants are
operated. In problem (3) it is clear that the market clearing condition for aggregate labor
holds with equality. The other inequality constraints bind or not, indicating the mass of
plants that operate and the amount of labor input assigned to each plant.
Proposition 1 Let α ≡ ((1 − θ)zH/zL)
1/θ and ρ ≡ (zH/zL)
1/θ . The aggregate production
function is the solution to the maximization problem in (3) and is given by:
F (Nt,M H,t,M L,t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




t if Nt ≥ η1,t
zHMθ
H,t(Nt − ML,t¯ n)
1−θ + zL¯ n1−θML,t if η2,t ≤ Nt ≤ η1,t




t if η4,t ≤ Nt ≤ η3,t
zH¯ n−θNt if Nt ≤ η4,t
(4)
where η1 ≡ (ρMH,t + ML,t)¯ n, η2 ≡ (GαMH,t + ML,t)¯ n, η3 ≡ GαMH,t¯ n, η4 ≡ MH,t¯ n






Proof. See Appendix A.3.
To understand the aggregate production function in equation (4) recall that the plant pro-
duction function has decreasing returns to scale for input levels above ¯ n (see equation 2). As
a result, plants have an optimal size. Given this optimal size, if the stock of high productivity
plants is not high enough to employ all the labor, then some or all of the low productivity
plants operate. In the ﬁrst branch of the production function, when Nt ≥ (ρMH,t + ML,t)¯ n,
all plants of both types operate and are allocated more than ¯ n units of labor. For lower
values of Nt, a higher fraction of the total labor input can be employed in high productivity
9plants and, as a result, the low productivity plants decrease their scale. First, low produc-
tivity plants hire ¯ n workers (see the second branch of the production function). Later, some
low productivity plants stop operating. In this case, low productivity plants are not a scarce
input in production and they earn no rent (see the third branch of the production function).
Finally, no low productivity plants operate. In this case, all the labor is hired at high pro-
ductivity plants and the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas. If Nt <M H,t¯ n,
only some high productivity plants operate and the rest are idle. This situation does not
occur in the equilibrium of this model as is explained later.
Remark 1 The aggregate production function, F : R3 → R is: (i) continuous, (ii) ho-
mogenous of degree one, (iii) weakly increasing (iv) diﬀerentiable everywhere except at
N = η1 = MH¯ n,a n d(v) weakly concave.
The aggregate labor input in this economy is a composite of diﬀerentiated types of labor.







where 1/(1 − ν) is the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated types of labor.
There is a representative ﬁrm in the economy that operates the plants. The problem of
the representative ﬁr mc a nb es t a t e di nt w op a r t s .F i r s t ,g i v e nf a c t o rp r i c e s :rH,t,r L,t and
wt, the ﬁrm chooses Nt,M H,t, and ML,t to maximize proﬁts:
max
Yt,Nt,MH,t,ML,t
Yt − wtNt − rH,tMH,t − rL,tML,t
s.t. Yt = F (Nt,M H,t,M L,t)
Second, for any given amount of aggregate labor, Nt, the demand for each diﬀerentiated
type of labor, lt (j), is the solution to:
wtNt =m i n
{lt(j)},j∈[0,1]
Z






where wt (j) i st h ew a g ef o rl a b o ro ft y p ej. Ii m p o s eν ≤ 1 so that the problem in (6)














T h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e ro fi n ﬁnitely lived consumers with a speciﬁct y p eo fl a b o r . T h e
consumers are organized in a continuum of unions indexed by j, j ∈ [0,1]. Each union
represents consumers with a speciﬁc type of labor. Unions are modeled in the spirit of
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Unions set the wage for labor of type j and face a downward
sloping demand for labor given by (7).




tU [Ct (j),l t (j)] (8)
The jth union chooses consumption, C (j), chooses non-negative investments in the high
and low type capital, XH (j) and XL (j), rents capital stocks MH (j) and ML(j), and chooses
the wage rate w(j), to maximize (8) subject to the demand for labor given in (7), the budget
constraints in (9) and the laws of motion for capital in (10).
(1 + τC,t)Ct (j)+XH,t(j)+XL,t (j) ≤ (1 − τN,t)wt (j)lt (j) (9)
+(1− τM,t)[rH,tMH,t(j)+rL,tML,t (j)]
+τM,t[δHMH,t(j)+δLML,t (j)] + Tt
MH,t+1 (j)=( 1 − δH)MH,t (j)+XH,t(j) (10)
ML,t+1 (j)=( 1 − δL)ML,t (j)+XL,t (j)
In the equations above, rH,t and rL,t are the rental rates of capital, τC,t,τN,t,τM,t are
taxes on consumption, labor income and capital income, respectively, and Tt are lump-sum
transfers. The union takes the rental rates, the aggregate wage, wt, and the tax rates as
exogenously given.
16Similarly, given the composite labor input, ni,t, hired at date t by a zi-plant, one can derive the demand
for each diﬀerentiated type of plant labor input li,t (j), where i ∈ {L,H} and j ∈ [0,1]. The following holds:
li,t (j)=( wt/wt (j))
1/(1−ν) ni,t. Thus, using equation (7), Ig e tli,t (j)=( ni,t/Nt) · lt (j), for all i ∈ {L,H}
for all j ∈ [0,1].
113.3 Government
The government taxes consumption, labor income and capital income. It permits depreci-
ation allowances as given by τM,t(δHMH,t (j)+δLML,t (j)) for every j. Transfers from the
rest of the world are an additional source of government revenues and are denoted by Trt.
The revenues collected by the government are lump-sum rebated to the households. Let this
rebate be denoted by Tt. The government balances its budget every period, hence:
Tt =
Z
[τC,tCt (j)+τN,twt (j)lt (j)]dj (11)
+
Z
[τM,t(rH,t − δH)MH,t(j)+τM,t(rL,t − δL)ML,t (j)]dj + Trt
The government has an additional role in this model: to inﬂuence the monopoly power
of the unions and the wage markups they can charge. This policy is modeled as a provision
to make unions set wages perfectly competitively if the markups exceed 1/¯ νt where ¯ νt ≥ ν.
Under such a policy it is clear that the markup charged by unions is 1/¯ νt.
3.4 Equilibrium
In this section, I deﬁne and characterize an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium are allocations
n

























t=0 , initial conditions ML,0,M H,0
and prices {rH,t,r L,t,w t}
∞
t=0, the allocation {Ct (j),l s
t (j),X H,t (j),X L,t (j),M H,t (j),
ML,t (j)}∞
t=0 and {wt (j)}
∞
t=0 solve the jth union’s problem for every j ∈ [0,1].
2. Taking as given prices,
n








solves the ﬁrm’s problem.
3. The government balances its budget given by equation 11 for all t.









ML,t (j)dj = ML,t
Z
[Ct (j)+XH,t (j)+XL,t (j)]dj ≤ Yt + Trt
Consider an economy that transitions to a higher productivity technology. Initially, the
economy has only zL-plants. Due to the availability of more productive zH-plants, there
are no further investments made in the stock of low productivity plants. This follows from
the fact that building plants of either type is equally costly, but the zL-plants are less
productive.17 As a result, the stock of zL-plants depreciates over time at rate δL ≥ 0, while
t h em o r ep r o d u c t i v ezH-plants accumulate during the transition.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the jth union problem are summarized by XL,t (j)=0 , the
budget constraints, the laws of motion for capital, as well as:
UC (Ct (j),l t (j))
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tUC [Ct (j),l t (j)]MH,t+1 (j)=0
The markup in the intratemporal condition (12) is given by:








where 1/ν is the wage markup that the union would choose, and 1/¯ νt is the markup
allowed by the government.18
I assume that ν ≤ ¯ νt ≤ 1 for all t. The wage markup in equilibrium is thus 1/¯ νt,
which means that the wage increases are mandated by the government. The markup is
an exogenous policy in the model. The values chosen for ¯ νt in numerical experiments are
discussed in Section 5.1.
17Using the aggregate production function in (4), it is easy to show that the marginal product of high
productivity plants, MH,t, is strictly higher than the marginal product of low productivity plants, ML,t,
whenever all high productivity plants operate.
18See Appendix A.3 for a derivation of the intratemporal condition (12).
13The ﬁrst order conditions of the representative ﬁrm’s problem are:
ri,t =
∂F (Nt,M H,t,M L,t)
∂Mi,t
,i ∈ {L,H},w t =
∂F (Nt,M H,t,M L,t)
∂Nt
Given the symmetry of the unions, they all make the same choices. In particular, wt (j)=
wt and lt (j)=Nt. Thus, from now on I drop the j subscripts.
Proposition 2 Along the transition path, as the stock of low productivity plants approaches
zero asymptotically, the aggregate production function in (4) becomes:
lim
ML,t→0





t if Nt ≥ MH,t¯ n
zH¯ n−θNt if Nt ≤ MH,t¯ n
Proof. See Appendix A.3.





then a unique steady state exists in which all
zH-plants operate and the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas.
Proof. Suppose there is a steady state in which some zH-plants are idle, and that this
steady state is reached at time T. I tm u s tb et h a ti ti sn o tp o s s i b l et oa l l o c a t ea tl e a s t¯ n
units of labor to all zH-plants, i.e. NT <M H,T¯ n. The output produced equals zH¯ n−θNT
(see Proposition 2). Given that the zH-plants are not a scarce input in production, they
earn no rents. There will be no investments undertaken: XH,T =0 . Thus, the capital stock
depreciates: MH,T+1 <M H,T.T h i sc o n t r a d i c t st h ef a c tt h a tas t e a d ys t a t ew a sr e a c h e da t
time T.
Hence, in a steady state all zH-plants operate and N∗ ≥ M∗
H¯ n, where ∗ denotes steady
state. Using the model’s ﬁrst order conditions, it is easy to show that this inequality is
equivalent to the one speciﬁed in the text of the proposition.
The minimum labor requirement, ¯ n, is a parameter of the model. In numerical experi-
ments, I choose ¯ n such that the parameter restriction in Proposition (3) is satisﬁed. Along
the transition path and in the new steady state, all zH plants operate. There is no uncer-
tainty in the model and due to the trade-oﬀ between consumption and savings, it is not
optimal to accumulate too many zH-plants and then leave some idle.
4 Predictions for Output and Factor Shares
In this section, I describe the dynamics of the model. First, I analyze an economy that
undergoes technology change, but receives no transfers from the rest of the world and has
14perfectly competitive wages. I focus on the model’s predictions for output and the capital
income share. Later, I discuss the model results in the presence of the government policies.
Finally, I show that the policies aﬀect the capital share in a nonlinear fashion.
4.1 Technology Change
Consider an economy as in Section 3, in which transfers are zero and the government man-
dates that wages be perfectly competitive, i.e. Trt =0and ¯ νt =1for all t.
The economy transitions from a low productivity technology, zL, to a high productivity
technology, zH. Initially there are only zL-plants in the economy. The better technology
becomes available and consumers stop investing in the low productivity plants, which de-
preciate over time as discussed previously. As zH-plants accumulate, a larger fraction of the
total labor in the economy is hired at these plants. As a result, low productivity plants
reduce their scale until they all hire only ¯ n labor.19 Next, one of two scenarios can occur.
If the productivity diﬀerence between the two types of plants is large enough (i.e. α>1),
only a fraction of the low productivity plants continue to operate and hire ¯ n units of labor,
w h i l et h er e s ta r el e f ti d l e . 20 However, if the diﬀerence in plant level productivities is smaller
(i.e. α<1), all zL-plants operate throughout the transition at the minimum scale and only
exit the economy as they depreciate. The intuition is that when α>1, the high productivity
capital stock accumulates faster during the transition and the high productivity plants also
hire more labor compared to the case when α<1. Low productivity plants cannot shrink
their size below ¯ n and, as a result, some of them become idle. Ultimately, in both scenarios,
only high productivity plants operate in the new steady state.
The diﬀerent stages of production during the transition generate interesting dynamics for
factor income shares. To illustrate this, I ﬁrst relate the plant proﬁt shares to the aggregate
capital income share. Let πi,t and φi,t denote total proﬁts and the proﬁts h a r ef o razi-plant
at time t.T h e nφi,t = πi,t/yi,t.
Proposition 4 The plant proﬁts h a r e ss a t i s f yφi,t ≤ θ for i ∈ {H,L} and for all t, where
equality holds if ni,t > ¯ n.
Proof. Follows from plant proﬁt maximization. See Appendix A.3.
19If ¯ n is low enough, it is possible that low productivity plants always hire more than ¯ n units of labor
(i.e. the minimum requirement constraint never binds in equilibrium). In this case, all zL-plants operate
during the transition and they exit the economy as they depreciate. This is in contrast to data from Eastern
European economies where plants were shut down during the transition. In numerical experiments, the
choice of ¯ n allows for low productivity plants to shut down during the transition (see Section 5.1).
20Recall that α ≡ ((1 − θ)zH/zL)
1/θ , so α>1 is equivalent to zH/zL > 1/(1 − θ). For θ =0 .34,α>1 if
the high productivity technology is about 50 percent more productive than the low productivity technology.
T h ec h o i c eo fα in numerical experiments is discussed in Section 5.1.
15If the minimum labor constraint does not bind, the plant labor productivity is propor-
tional to the wage rate and the plant proﬁt share is constant. However, if plants are con-
strained to hire ¯ n units of labor, they hire more labor than in an unconstrained optimum,
and, as a result, the proﬁt share is lower than θ.
In this economy, all high productivity plants operate throughout the transition and they
hire more than the minimum required labor. Hence, φH,t = θ for all t.L o w p r o d u c t i v i t y
plants initially hire more than ¯ n units of labor, but later switch to operating at the minimum
scale, as more and more labor is hired at the zH-plants. Thus, φL,t ≤ θ with strict inequality
for some t.
Let φt denote the aggregate capital income share at time t. Then, φt =( ΠH,t + ΠL,t)/Yt,
where Πi,t are the total proﬁts for plants of type zi at time t and Yt is the aggregate output
at t. Letting Yi,t be the total output produced by plants of type zi at t, the aggregate capital

















The second equality is obtained using Πi,t/Yi,t = πi,tMi,t/yi,tMi,t = φi,t for all i, and for
all t. Moreover, using the result φH,t = θ for all t, the aggregate capital income share is:






Equation (13) s h o w st h a ti ft h ep r o ﬁts h a r eo fzL-plants is equal to θ or the total output
produced by these plants is zero, the aggregate capital income share is constant and equal
to θ. However, if φL,t <θand YL,t > 0 then φ<θ .
The non-convexity in the plant-level technology is key in delivering variation in the capital
share in the economy. Recall that low productivity plants have a proﬁt share lower than θ
whenever they hire only ¯ n units of labor (Proposition 4). Hence, the capital income share of
this economy is lower than θ in two cases: (i) all low productivity plants operate and they
hire ¯ n labor, or (ii) only some low productivity plants operate and hire ¯ n labor.
The dynamics of the aggregate capital income share are shown in Figure 3. The left
side panel plots the aggregate capital share in an economy with α>1. Initially, all plants
operate and hire more than ¯ n units of labor and the aggregate capital share equals θ. As
the stock of zH-plants accumulates over time, the low productivity plants reduce their scale.
First all zL-plants operate at ¯ n, then some of them stop operating. During this process, the
16capital income share falls below θ. In periods when some zL-plants are idle, they earn no
rents because they are not a scarce input in production. The capital share increases rapidly
during these periods, as the economy gets rid of plants with a low proﬁt share. In the steady
state of the economy, the capital share is constant again and equal to θ. The U-shaped
dynamics for the aggregate capital share are slightly diﬀerent when α<1 ( s e et h er i g h ts i d e
panel of Figure 3). As discussed previously, when the productivity diﬀerence between the
two types of plants is smaller, so that α<1, all zL-plants operate throughout the transition
and they exit the economy as they depreciate. The aggregate capital share drops below θ
as low productivity plants operate at the corner. As the economy replaces these plants, the
capital share returns gradually to the value θ.
4.2 Technology Change, Transfers and Wage Markups
Here I discuss the predictions of an economy that undergoes technology change, has perfectly
competitive wages, but receives transfers from abroad, i.e. Trt > 0 and ¯ νt =1for all t.
Suppose there are no transfers at time t =0 , and there is a permanent increase in the
ﬂow of transfers starting at time t =1 , so that Trt = Tr1 > 0 for all t ≥ 1. The consumers
are richer, and as a result the labor input is lower compared to a model with no transfers.
There is a drop in labor at time t =1due to the introduction of the policy. If transfers are
large enough, the drop in labor is associated with a negative growth in output from time
t =0to t =1 . Following the introduction of transfers, the stock of high productivity capital
accumulates faster in this economy leading to higher output growth compared to an economy
with zero transfers.
The aggregate capital income share has U-shape dynamics as discussed in Section 4.1.
Compared to a model with zero transfers, the decline in the capital share may occur sooner
in the transition and may be of a larger magnitude (see Figure 4). An economy with transfers
has lower aggregate labor and each plant’s labor input, ni,t, is lower. If transfers are large
enough, low productivity plants operate at the minimum scale ¯ n sooner than in a model with
zero transfers. The proﬁt share at these plants declines and the economy’s capital share is
less than θ, earlier in the transition.
Moreover, the decline in the capital share may be of larger magnitude in the economy




Yt . First, the proﬁts h a r e
of low productivity plants, φL,t, is lower compared to a model with zero transfers. When
zL-plants operate at ¯ n, they have a ﬁxed output given by zL¯ n1−θ. T h eh i g h e rw a g er a t et h a t
prevails in an economy with transfers thus leads to lower proﬁts, πL,t = zL¯ n1−θ −wt¯ n, and a
lower proﬁt share. Second, the share of output produced by low productivity plants, YL,t/Yt,
17is higher compared to a model with zero transfers. The zH-plants decrease their optimal
labor input and hence their output in response to the higher wages. Low productivity plants
are constrained to operate at ¯ n. All else equal, this leads to a larger share of output being
produced by low productivity plants.
Now consider an economy that undergoes technology change, receives no transfers from
the rest of the world but has wage markups. Wages are perfectly competitive at time t =0 ,
and the government mandates a permanent increase in wage markups at time t =1 . That
is, ¯ ν0 =1 , ¯ νt < 1 for all t ≥ 1. The economy with wage markups has lower growth rates
of output during the transition to the steady state compared to a perfectly competitive
economy. Wage markups depress the labor input and the accumulation of capital and lead
to an increase in the wage rate. The dynamics of the aggregate capital share are similar to
those present in an economy with transfers (see Figure 4).
4.3 Nonlinearities
In section 4.2, I discussed in turn the impact of transfers and wage markups on the aggregate
capital income share. Here, I show by means of numerical experiments that the capital
income share is a concave function of the policies. This implies that, the impact of the
two policies on the capital income share may be nonlinear. This illustration is important in
understanding the quantitative results shown in Section 5.
Consider an economy as described in Section 3. Let transfers be initially zero, Tr0 =0 ,
and then a ﬁxed percent of gross domestic product, Trt = Trfor all t ≥ 1. Let wage markups
be initially null, ν0 =1 ,a n dt h e nﬁxed at 1/νt for all t ≥ 1. Let Tr ∈ {0,1,2,...75} and




t=0 , and for a ﬁxed set of parameters, I
compute the equilibrium path for the capital income share. Next, I pick a time period t and
I compare the model’s capital income share at time t under diﬀerent levels of transfers and
wage markups.
The solid line in Figure 5 plots the capital income share at time t =3as a function of
transfers in an economy with no wage markups (i.e. ¯ νt =1for all t). The dashed line plots
the capital income share as transfers vary when the wage markup is 1.3 for all t ≥ 1. In an
economy with no markups and transfers of 30% of GDP, the capital income share at t =3is
0.335 (see point A in Figure 5). An economy with wage markup 1/νt =1 .3 and no transfers
has a capital income share equal to 0.316 (see point B in the graph). However, point C
shows that the capital share in an economy with both policies is 0.267. If the policies were
to have an additive eﬀect on the capital share, one would expect the dashed line in the ﬁgure
to be parallel to the solid line and the capital share marked by point C to be about 0.31.
18The nonlinear eﬀects observed are driven by asymmetric responses of the diﬀerent plants
to the policies. Larger transfers or higher markups lead to increases in the wage and depress
aggregate labor. As a result, high productivity plants always lower their labor input and
maintain a capital share of θ. However, low productivity plants are forced to keep labor at
¯ n in order to produce positive output and thus have a proﬁt share lower than θ.W i t hl a r g e
transfers and large wage markups: (i) a higher fraction of total output is produced by the
low productivity plants and (ii) the proﬁts h a r eo ft h e s ep l a n t sd e c l i n e s .T h e s et w oe ﬀects





(see section 4.1 for derivation). Thus, policies aﬀect the aggregate capital share in a nonlinear
fashion.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I choose parameters based on national accounts data and revenue statistics.
I show that the model’s equilibrium paths line up well with East German data on output,
expenditure shares, factor income shares, and hours worked. I then perform a counterfactual
experiment. I remove the government-mandated wage increases and use the model to make
predictions about output growth and factor income shares. Lastly, I perform experiments
for Poland.
5.1 Parameter Choices
Table 2 summarizes the values of the model’s parameters (see appendix A.1 for data sources).
The economy speciﬁc parameters are the transfers, wage markups, tax rates, as well as the
productivity level zL.
Tax rates on consumption, labor income and capital income are computed using the
methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). In the model, tax rates do not vary over
time. For East Germany, they are set to the average tax rates for Germany over the period
1990 − 2005. For Poland, I use average tax rates for the period 1995 − 2005, due to data
availability. The productivity level zL i ss e tt om a t c ht h ei n i t i a ll e v e lo fo u t p u ti nt h et w o
economies.
The steady state capital income share, θ, is set to the 1991 to 2006 average for uniﬁed
Germany (see equation 1 for details on the computation). The capital share of West Germany
is fairly constant over time. East Germany is small relative to the West and its large capital
share variation has a very small impact on the share for uniﬁed Germany. The annual
depreciation rate of the capital stocks is set to be the same for both stocks and it is consistent
19with the investment and capital stock data for Germany. The discount factor is chosen so
that the annual real interest rate is 4%.
The initial capital stocks for East Germany are determined as follows. I set the stock of
high productivity plants to zero in 1989. This is consistent with the idea that the physical
capital was outdated. I set the stock of low productivity plants to 3.5 times the size of
GDP in 1989. Sinn and Sinn (1992) document that the net stock of ﬁxed assets (excluding
land) in 1989 was somewhere between 1.6 times GDP and 4.9 times GDP. The high end
estimate is based on an exchange rate of 1 to 1 between the Mark and and Deutsche Mark,
a n d ,a st h e yp o i n to u t ,i tp r o b a b l yd i dn o tr e p r e s e n tt h et r u em a r k e tv a l u eo fc a p i t a l .T h e
low range estimate is obtained by writing oﬀ 67% of the capital stock to accommodate the
West German accounting rules.21 In the model, the stock of low productivity plants becomes
outdated once the new technology is available, and there are no further investments into it.
This stock depreciates gradually over time. To be consistent with the model, I do not use the
low end estimate of the capital-output ratio because it takes some depreciation into account.
The parameter ¯ n is a key parameter of the model. As indicated in Proposition 3, for
a steady state to exist, ¯ n needs to be such that N∗ ≥ M∗
H¯ n where ∗ denotes steady state.





.F o r v e r y l o w v a l u e s o f¯ n the model is not very
interesting: all zL-plants would operate during the transition (nL > ¯ n) and they would ulti-
mately disappear only because the stock depreciates. I pick ¯ n ' N∗/M ∗
H. This choice allows
low productivity plants to hit the minimum labor constraint and shut down earlier in the
transition.
The utility function used in the numerical experiments is U (C,l)=l o g( C)+ψlog(1 − l).
The parameters ψ,zH,¯ νt are chosen so that the model matches the level of aggregate hours22
21For a discussion of the capital stock in East Germany see Sinn and Sinn (1992, pp. 43-44). Also see
their Appendix A on pages 214-216, for the data needed to compute the capital-output ratio.
22 Aggregate hours worked by a working-age person are computed as follows:
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Population 15 − 64
,
where H denotes total hours worked and E denotes total employment. I compute an estimate of aggregate
hours in 1989 using data on aggregate hours in 1991, as well as estimates of changes in H/E,E and population
over the two year period.
In 1991, the employment rate in East Germany was 70% a n da ne m p l o y e dp e r s o nw o r k e da b o u t1,540
hours per year. This gives an average of 1,080 hours per year per working-age person or, relative to 52
weeks in a year, about 20.7 hours a week. To compute aggregate hours in 1989, I use data provided in a
few studies. Dornbusch and Wolf (1994) report a 26.5% drop in total employment in East Germany from
1989 to 1991. Krueger and Pischke (1995) report a similar number. Over the same period, population ages
15 − 64 shrank by 3% (see Appendix A.1 for data sources). Moreover, hours worked by employed persons
declined by about 4.5% as reported by Bird, Schwarze, and Wagner (1994). I obtain an estimate of 28.7
hours worked per week in 1989.
20in East Germany in 1989, the increase in total factor productivity23 in East Germany from
1991 to 2006 and the large wage increases observed early in the transition. I set ¯ ν1989 =1 .
Ip i c k¯ ν1990 < 1 and ¯ ν1991 < 1 so that the model matches the wage increases between 1989
and 1991 documented in Table 1. Thereafter, I keep markups 1/¯ νt unchanged (see Figure
6). In the Appendix A.2, I perform sensitivity analysis by allowing the wage markups, 1/¯ νt,
to decline gradually over time after the initial increase.
The transfers, Trt, to East Germany represent net transfers from West Germany as well
as the European Union. Transfers are zero in model period 1989. Up to year 2002, Iu s e
estimates of total net transfers provided by the European Commission. Beginning 2002, I
let model transfers decline over time and I assume they reach zero in 2019 (see Figure 6).
The Solidarity Pact II signed by the federal states and aimed at promoting the development
of East Germany is scheduled to end in 2019. While this aid package is just a part of the
transfers received by East Germany, I assume that by 2019 all other transfers will stop as
well. In the Appendix A.2, I perform sensitivity analysis by allowing transfers to decline to
zero farther in the future.
The transfers and wage markups for Poland are set in a similar fashion (see Figure 6).
The transfers to Poland are taken from the data up until 2007, and are set to the average
value of 1.5 percent of GDP thereafter. Given the recent accession to the EU, I consider
that these transfers will not decline to zero in the near future.
5.2 Predictions for East Germany
I now use the parametrized model to examine the East German transition. Figure 7 plots
the equilibrium paths of total factor productivity, hourly wages, GDP, the capital income
share, hours worked and expenditure shares against East German data.
As discussed in Section 5.1, the parameters were chosen such that the model delivers an
increase in TFP of about 30% between 1991 and 2006, consistent with East German data (see
top left panel in Figure 7). The model’s total factor productivity grows endogenously over
time during the transition. The economy accumulates the more productive plants gradually
over time, and so, the model does not deliver the sharp increase in TFP observed in the data
between 1991 to 1995. Moreover, recall that the model was parametrized to match the large
increases in hourly wages between 1989 and 1991. However, the behavior of the wage rate
following year 1991 is determined endogenously, and it matches the data well.
The middle left panel of Figure 7 compares the model’s GDP with detrended data on
23The model’s total factor productivity is calculated as the Solow residual from a standard Cobb-Douglas







, where MH,t + ML,t represents the total capital
stock of the economy at time t. This is consistent with the calculation of TFP from data.
21GDP per working-age person.24 From 1989 to 1991, the model’s output declines by 10%,
about one third of the decline observed in the data. This drop in output is driven by the
decline in hours worked.25 First, the large increases in hourly wages between 1989 and 1991
depress hours worked in the model. Moreover, the transfers received generate a wealth eﬀect
which also leads to reductions in hours. Starting in 1991, output in the model grows. The
initial output growth is lower than observed in East German data, because the productivity
improvements in the model occur gradually, as discussed previously. However, the overall
output growth in the model over the period 1991 − 2006 is very similar to the data.
The model predicts a time-varying capital income share, as observed in the middle right
panel of Figure 7. The capital share is equal to θ =0 .34 in the ﬁrst two years of the
transition. Afterwards, due to the accumulation of the more productive technology, the low
productivity plants are operated at the minimum scale. The transfers and wage increases
raise the cost of labor and reduce the proﬁts of the zL-plants further. As a result, the capital
share declines (see Section 4 for more detail). The model delivers a 10 percentage points
drop in the capital share between 1990 and 1991. The capital share is 0.24 in 1991 and starts
increasing as less output in the economy is produced by the zL-plants. The model predicts
that by 2005 the economy will not use any low productivity plants for production. The stock
ML is not completely depreciated by that time, but the remaining plants are left idle.
The bottom panels in Figure 7 show the model’s predictions for hours worked and expen-
diture shares. The large transfers and wage increases contribute to a 29% decline in hours
worked between 1989 and 1991. This is in line with East German data (see footnote 22 for
details on the construction of hours worked in the data). After 1991, the model predicts a
slight increase in hours due to the decline in transfers over time.
Last but not least, the model’s predictions for expenditure shares match the data. Since
uniﬁcation, East Germans have consumed and invested a lot more than they have pro-
duced, as measured by the economy’s gross domestic product. In particular, the average
consumption to output ratio was about 1.02 over the period 1991 to 2006, while the average
investment to output ratio was about 0.35. This was made possible through the large trans-
fers received. In the model, transfers are available for consumption and investment. Most
24Gross domestic product per population aged 15−64 is detrended with an annual trend growth of 1.013.
The model does not have exogenous growth in technology or population, so the transformation is necessary
to make data and model comparable. The choice of 1.3 percent annual trend growth corresponds to the
growth rate of output per working-age person in West Germany since 1990.
25In the model, changes in the capital stock do not contribute to depressing output. The total capital
stock of the economy, ML,t + MH,t, decreases slighlty initially. However, what matters for output in the
initial two years of transition is a productivity-adjusted measure of capital, ρMH + ML, which does not
decline (Recall that the economy starts out with no zH-plants. The model’s output in 1989 and 1990 is given
by F (N,MH,M L)=zL (ρMH + ML)
θ N1−θ, as seen in the ﬁrst branch of (4)).
22transfers get allocated to consumption, and only some go to investment, consistent with
data observations. The model delivers an average consumption share of output of 1 and an
average investment share of 0.33 for the period 1991 to 2006. The counterparts in a model
with no transfers
¡
i.e. Trt =0for all t
¢
are a consumption-output ratio of about 73% and
an investment-output ratio of about 27%.
I have shown that the model with transfers and wage markups performs well in accounting
for key facts of the East German transition. Next, I perform a counterfactual experiment.
I remove the government-mandated wage increases from the model (i.e. I set ¯ νt =1for all
t), and I examine the predictions for output, the capital income share, hours worked and
expenditure shares. The results are shown in Figure 8. This experiment with the transfer
policy alone delivers a smaller decline in hours worked and a smaller drop in output early in
the transition. Throughout the transition, hours are higher and the zH-plants accumulate
faster. As a result, the East German GDP per working-age person grows by more, compared
to the experiment with both policies. Moreover, as seen in the top right panel of Figure 8,
t h ev a r i a t i o n si nt h ec a p i t a li n c o m es h a r ea r es maller compared to the previous experiment.
The capital income share is 0.33 in 1991 compared to 0.24 in the experiment with transfers
and wage markups.
The success of the model in delivering a large initial drop in the capital share for East
Germany is due to the government policies.26 In an experiment without transfers or wage
markups (i.e. Trt =0and ¯ νt =1for all t) ,t h ec a p i t a li n c o m es h a r ev a r i e sb ya tm o s t5
percentage points throughout the transition. These variations occur due to the change in
technology. Introducing either of the two policies in the model yields further declines in the
capital share through the mechanisms described in Section 4.2. The experiment with the
East German transfers alone delivers a capital share of 0.33 in 1991, as seen in Figure 8. An
experiment with the East German wage markups alone delivers a capital share of 0.30 in
1991. However, when the two policies are considered together they have a nonlinear impact
on the capital income share as described in section 4.3. The result is a capital share of 0.24
in 1991, as seen in the experiment with both policies (see Figure 7 or 8).
5.3 Predictions for Poland
Unlike East Germany, Poland received small transfers from the rest of the world and had
more moderate wage growth throughout the transition (see Figure 6 and Table 1). The
model’s predictions for Poland are plotted in Figure 9. As seen in the top left panel of the
26As emphasized previously, the non-convexity in the plant-level production technology is key in allowing
for variation in the capital share. In a model without this non-convexity, the government policies have no
eﬀect on the capital share.
23ﬁgure, the model is unsuccessful in delivering a decline in GDP per working-age person for
Poland in the ﬁrst years of the transition. Recall that the drop in output observed for East
Germany is due to the decline in hours worked. While the model accounts for the decline
in hours worked observed in Poland, this decline is smaller compared to East Germany, and
is oﬀset entirely by the increase in the capital stock. Hence, there is no drop in GDP in the
model.
Earlier, I showed that transfers and government-mandated wage increases contributed to
lowering the capital income share in East Germany. For Poland, the model’s capital income
share varies very little during the transition, as seen in the top right panel of Figure 9. These
variations are due to technology change, while the contributions of the two policies are fairly
unimportant. The model performs fairly well in this regard.27 Regarding the expenditure
shares, the model predicts a relatively high investment to output ratio early in the transition,
as the economy accumulates the stock of zH-plants.
The results for Poland are in contrast to those observed for East Germany. They highlight
the fact that the large transfers and wage increases observed in East Germany contributed
to a sizable decline in output and in the capital share early in the transition.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
I examined the implications of two government policies on East Germany’s output growth
and factor income shares, in a model with embodied technological change. Transfers have
a positive impact on output growth because they allow for more capital investment. Labor
market policies such as government-mandated wage increases have a negative impact on
capital accumulation, labor supply and output growth. The two policies generate somewhat
oﬀsetting eﬀects on output growth and thus reveal why East Germany did not experience a
growth miracle, in spite of the extensive support it received since early 1990s. In addition, the
predictions for factor income shares are in line with East German data showing an initially
low capital share that rises throughout the transition.
It is well documented that in many countries the shares of income accruing to capital
and labor are fairly constant, but show small variations over time. In the model presented
here, the transition to a higher productivity technology leads to endogenous variations in
the capital income share. These variations arise due to a non-convexity in the plant level
production technology, and are ampliﬁed by the government policies considered. While the
paper analyzes transition economies, the ﬁndings on the capital share have potential for
a wider applicability. Technology change induces relatively small variation in the model’s
27See footnote 8 for details on the increase in Poland’s capital income share since 2004.
24capital share. This mechanism could be useful in accounting for some of the variations in
factor income shares observed in the U.S. and other economies.
A.1 Data Appendix
The data used in this paper were collected from several sources: (i) Regional Accounts data
from the German Statistical Oﬃces, abbreviated henceforth as VGRdL (Statistisches Ämter
D e rB u n d e su n dD e rL ä n d e r ,V o l k s w i r t s c haftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder available
at: http://www.statistik-bw.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR), (ii) the Groningen Growth and Devel-
opment Centre and the Conference Board, Total Economy Database, abbreviated hence-
forth as GGDC (available at: http://www.ggdc.net), (iii) the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, abbreviated henceforth as OECD (national accounts avail-
able at: www.sourceoecd.org and labor force statistics available at http://stats.oecd.org) and
(iv) the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany, abbreviated henceforth Destatis (Statistisches
Bundesamt Deutschland, available at http://www.destatis.de/e_home.htm, Genesis Online
Database).
Data for East Germany from the German statistical agencies is data for the ﬁve Länder:
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen. East
Berlin is not included due to lack of data.
Gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in dollars at purchasing power parities for East
Germany is constructed using data from VGRdL and GGDC. The growth rates of real GDP
from the two sources are fairly similar for the years where there is overlap, so I use the level
given by GGDC for years 1989−1991 and the growth rates provided by VGRdL thereafter.
For Poland, GDP data is from GGDC (OECD data gives the same growth).
Data on population of ages 15 to 64 for East Germany is obtained from Destatis starting
1991 (Series 12411 − 0011, Bevölkerung: Bundesländer, Stichtag, Altersjahre). For 1989
and 1990, I use data from Statistical Yearbooks of the Democratic Republic (Statistisches
Jahrbuch Der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik). Population data for Poland is from
OECD.
I compute the capital income share using the formula in equation 1. For East Germany, I
use data from VGRdL, Excel Table "Production, distribution and use of the gross domestic
product in Germany by Bundesland and East West Regions 1991 to 2008". To obtain an
estimate for the labor income of the self-employed, I assume that each self-employed person
earns the average employees’ compensation. This imputation method was suggested by
Gollin (2002, p. 468). For Poland, I use data from OECD.
To construct hourly wage rates starting 1991, I use data on compensation of employees
25and total hours worked by employees. The nominal wage rates obtained are then deﬂated
using the consumption deﬂator from the national accounts. For East Germany, I use data
from VGRdL. To obtain total hours worked prior to 1997, I also use data on annual hours
worked per employed person from OECD. For Poland, I use data from GGDC and OECD.
I also construct hours worked per working-age person starting 1989 for a number of
other transition economies using the following sources: GGDC for total hours worked and
World Development Indicators (available at: http://www.worldbank.org/ under "Data and
Research") for population 15 − 64.
N e tt r a n s f e r sf r o mt h er e s to ft h ew o r l dfor East Germany are obtained from European
Commission (2002) and Jensen (2004). Transfers as a percent of East German GDP are also
reported in Ross (2001). Net transfers for Poland are obtained from OECD national accounts,
Table 4 "Disposable income, saving and net lending/net borrowing". For a discussion of the
E.U. transfers to Poland also see Box 2.4 in OECD (2004).
A.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Wage markups and transfers are quantitatively important in accounting for the East German
data presented in this paper. I perform sensitivity analysis for the choice of these exogenous
time-varying inputs.
First, in the experiments performed in Section 5, the wage markups were unchanged
starting 1991 (see Figure 6). Here, I consider wage markups that decline gradually over
time. I keep the same wage markups for East Germany for years 1989 − 1991, but decrease
the markups linearly thereafter, so that in year 2020 t h e r ei sn om a r k u p(¯ ν2020 =1 ) .T h e
predictions from this experiment are nearly identical for the period 1989 to 2000 to the results
plotted in Figure 7. The main diﬀerence is a smaller increase in wages. This leads to a larger
increase in hours worked and a higher GDP per capita, both of which are quantitatively
important after year 2000. The higher level of labor input that prevails in the model with
declining markups means that zL-plants are used in production for a longer time, and they
exit the economy later. As a result, the capital income share in this model is a bit lower for
years 2000−2006 compared to the values reported in Figure 7. The total factor productivity
and the expenditure shares are quite similar between the two experiments.
Second, I perform sensitivity analysis by allowing transfers to decline to zero only ten
years later, in year 2028. The predictions from this experiment are almost identical for the
period 1989 to 2006 to the results plotted in Figure 7. The main diﬀerences in predictions
occur after 2020, when due to positive transfers, the labor input will be lower.
26A.3 Technical Appendix
This appendix derives results from the paper. Section A.3.1 derives the aggregate production
function given in Proposition 1 in the paper. The decision rules for the plant labor inputs, nH
and nL, are derived simultaneously and are given in Corollary 1. The steady state aggregate
production function is given in Section A.3.2. Section A.3.3 derives properties of the plant
proﬁt shares given in Proposition 4 in the paper. Finally, Section A.3.4 derives equilibrium
equations of the model.
A.3.1 The Aggregate Production Function
The aggregate production function has ﬁve branches depending on which types of plants
operate and how much labor they employ. To simplify notation, I drop the time subscripts.
Recall zH >z L.
Case 1: Suppose all plants operate and are allocated more than the minimum labor re-
quirement. That is, mi = Mi for i ∈ {L,H}, and ni > ¯ n for i ∈ {L,H}.
The aggregate production function is the solution to:







s.t. MHnH + MLnL = N















I now use the expressions for the optimal nH and nL to obtain the expression for F.
F (N,MH,M L)=zLN
1−θ (ρMH + ML)
θ




> ¯ n ⇔ N>(ρMH + ML)¯ n
To summarize: If N>(ρMH + ML)¯ n, then F (N,MH,M L)=zL (ρMH + ML)
θ N1−θ.
Case 2. Suppose all plants operate. Suppose zH-plants are allocated more than the min-
imum labor requirement, while zL-plants operate at the minimum scale. That is, mi = Mi
for i ∈ {L,H},n H > ¯ n, and nL =¯ n.
The aggregate production function is the solution to:




H + MLzL¯ n
1−θ
s.t. MHnH + ML¯ n = N
Solution for nH is:
nH =
N − ML¯ n
MH
The aggregate production function is given by:
F (N,MH,M L)=zHM
θ
H (N − ML¯ n)
1−θ + zL¯ n
1−θML
The restriction nH > ¯ n implies that:
N>(MH + ML)¯ n
To summarize:I fN>(MH + ML)¯ n then
F (N,MH,M L)=zHMθ
H (N − ML¯ n)
1−θ + zL¯ n1−θML.
Case 3: Suppose all zH-plants operate and are allocated at least the minimum labor
requirement. Suppose only some zL-plants operate and they operate at the minimum scale.
That is, mH = MH, 0 <m L <M L,n H ≥ ¯ n, and nL =¯ n.
The aggregate production function is the solution to:




H + mLzL¯ n
1−θ
s.t. MHnH + mL¯ n = N































. Recall that I assumed nH ≥ ¯ n. Thus, I obtain
nH =m a x{1,α} ¯ n
Moreover, the assumption 0 <m L <M L becomes:
max{1,α}MH¯ n<N<[max{1,α}MH + ML]¯ n







1−θ − zL max{1,α}
i
¯ n1−θMH
Case 4. Suppose all zH-plants operate and are allocated more than the minimum labor
requirement. Suppose no zL-plants operate. That is, mH = MH,m L =0 ,n H > ¯ n, and
nL =0 .
The aggregate production function is the solution to:





s.t. MHnH = N





Recall I assumed nH > ¯ n. This implies that N/MH > ¯ n. Moreover, from Case 3 Ik n o w
that if max{1,α}MH¯ n<Nthen mL > 0; hence, I can restrict N ≤ max{1,α}MH¯ n
To summarize:I fMH¯ n<N≤ max{1,α}MH¯ n, then F (N,MH,M L)=zHMθ
HN1−θ.
29Case 5. Suppose only some zH-plants operate, they operate at the minimum scale. Sup-
pose no zL-plants operate. That is, mH <M H,m L =0 ,n H =¯ n, and nL =0 .
The aggregate production function is the solution to:




s.t. mH¯ n = N
The solution is mH = N/¯ n and
F (N,MH,M L)=zH¯ n
−θN
Recall I assumed mH <M H. This implies N/¯ n<M H.
To summarize:I fN<M H¯ n, then F (N,MH,M L)=zH¯ n−θN.
So far, I have derived that:
F (N,MH,M L)= (14)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
f1 ≡ zL (ρMH + ML)
θ N1−θ if N>(ρMH + ML)¯ n
f2 ≡ zHMθ
H (N − ML¯ n)
1−θ + zL¯ n1−θML if N>(MH + ML)¯ n
f3 ≡ AMH + zL¯ n−θN if GαMH¯ n ≤ N<(GαMH + ML)¯ n
f4 ≡ zHMθ
HN1−θ if MH¯ n ≤ N ≤ GαMH¯ n
f5 ≡ zH¯ n−θN if N ≤ MH¯ n






Next, it is easy to show that the following statements hold:
f1 = f2 if N =( ρMH + ML)¯ n (15)
f1 >f 2 if N>(ρMH + ML)¯ n
f3 = f2 if N =( GαMH + ML)¯ n
f3 >f 2 if N ∈ ((MH + ML)¯ n,(αMH + ML)¯ n) where α>1
The expression in (14) together with the statements in (15) give the production function in
Proposition (1) in the paper. ¥
30Corollary 1 The decision rules for plant labor are given by:
nH,t =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
ρNt
ρMH,t+ML,t if Nt ≥ η1,t
Nt−ML,t¯ n












¯ n if Nt ≤ η4,t
nL =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
Nt
ρMH,t+ML,t if Nt ≥ η1,t












0 if Nt ≤ η4,t
where η1 ≡ (ρMH,t + ML,t)¯ n, η2 ≡ (GαMH,t + ML,t)¯ n, η3 ≡ GαMH,t¯ n, η4 ≡ MH,t¯ n and
where Gα ≡ max{1,α}.
A.3.2 The Steady State Aggregate Production Function
During the transition the stock of zL-plants depreciates over time while the more productive




η1,t = ρMH,t¯ n
lim
ML,t→0
η2,t = GαMH,t¯ n = η3,t
The limit of the aggregate production function is:
lim
ML,t→0
F (Nt,M H,t,M L,t)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨








t if GαMH,t¯ n ≤ Nt ≤ ρMH,t¯ n




t if MH,t¯ n ≤ Nt ≤ GαMH,t¯ n
zH¯ n−θNt if Nt ≤ MH,t¯ n






Notice that as ML → 0 the third branch of the production function essentially collapses
31to one point. At Nt = GαMH,t¯ n the output is:






















Moreover, given the deﬁnition of ρ Ih a v ezLρθ = zH. To summarize:
lim
ML,t→0





t if Nt ≥ MH,t¯ n
zH¯ n−θNt if Nt ≤ MH,t¯ n
A.3.3 Plant ProﬁtS h a r e s
I derive the result in Proposition 4 in the paper.






s.t. ni,t ≥ ¯ n
The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is wt ≥ (1 − θ)zin
−θ
i,t , with equality if ni,t > ¯ n.















= φi,t ≤ θ, with equality if ni,t > ¯ n.
A.3.4 Intertemporal and Intratemporal Equilibrium Conditions
Here I derive the ﬁrst order conditions of the jth union’s problem. For the time being, I
ignore the government’s requirement that the markup be at most 1/¯ νt.L e t λt (j) denote
the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint at time t. The ﬁrst order conditions of
this problem are summarized by the budget constraints, the laws of motion for capital,
32XL,t (j)=0 , as well as:
β
tUC [Ct (j),l t (j)] = λt (j) · (1 + τC,t)
β
tUl [Ct (j),l t (j)]
∂lt (j)
∂wt (j)









=( 1 + ( 1 − τM,t+1)(rH,t+1 − δH))
and the transversality condition: limt→∞ β
tUC [Ct (j),l t (j)]MH,t+1 (j)=0 .
The Euler Equation is:
UC (Ct (j),l t (j))




(1 + (1 − τM,t+1)(rH,t+1 − δH))
In order to derive the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption I ﬁrst derive ∂lt (j)/∂wt (j). Recall that the demand for labor of type j is given






















Thus, equation (16) becomes:
β










tUl [Ct (j),l t (j)] = −λt (1 − τN,t)νwt (j)






Ul [Ct (j),l t (j)]
UC [Ct (j),l t (j)]
(17)
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East Germany Poland
1989 − 1990 12.5 negative
1990 − 1991 32.33
1991 − 1992 16 18
Average, 1992 − 2006 2 2
Notes: Wages used in the calculations are real unless otherwise noted. The deﬂator used is the
consumption deﬂator from national accounts. East Germany: table reports nominal wage growth for
1989-1990 from Krueger and Pischke (1995), but, as they point out, this mostly reﬂects real changes
due to a relatively stable average CPI.28 Data for 1990-1991 is real hourly wage data from Hunt (2001).
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38Table 2: Model Parameters and Time-Varying Inputs
Common Parameters Model Expression Value
Discount factor β 0.97
Depreciation rates for capital δH = δL 0.07
Capital income share θ 0.34
Leisure parameter ψ 1.03
Ratio of plant productivities zH/zL 1.60
Capital stock of type zH in 1989 MH,0 0.00
Minimum labor requirement ¯ n 0.005
Values
Economy Specific Parameters Model Expression East Germany Poland
Parameters
Low productivity level zL 6.60 4.68
Tax rate on consumption τC 0.15 0.18
Tax rate on labor income τN 0.40 0.44
Tax rate on capital income τM 0.25 0.20
Time-Varying Inputs
Transfers Trt see Figure 6
Wage markups 1/νt see Figure 6
39Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product per Working-Age Person


























Figure 2: The Capital Income Share










40Figure 3: The Capital Share in a Model with Technology Change Only








































Model with Technology Change Only
Model with Technology Change and Transfers
41Figure 5: The Capital Share as a Function of Policies














Wage Markup = 1.3
Figure 6: Model Inputs: Transfers and Wage Markups



























42Figure 7: East Germany: Data and Model Predictions





























































































Model with Transfers and Wage Markups
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43Figure 8: East Germany: Data and Predictions from Different Experiments

















































Model with Transfers and Wage Markups
Model with Transfers Only
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44Figure 9: Poland: Data and Model Predictions
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